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An extended social choice framework is proposed for the analysis of ini-
tial conferment of individual rights. This framework captures the intuitive
conception of decision-making procedure as a carrier of intrinsic value along
with the instrumental usefulness thereof in realizing valuable culmination out-
comes. The model of social decision-making consists of two stages. In the ﬁrst
stage, the society decides on the game-form rights to be promulgated. In the
second stage, the promulgated game form rights, coupled with the revealed
proﬁle of individual preference orderings over the set of culmination outcomes,
determine a fully-ﬂedged game, the play of which determines a culmination
outcome at the Nash equilibrium. A set of suﬃcient conditions for the exis-
tence of a social choice procedure, which can choose a game form in the ﬁrst
stage that is not only liberal, but also uniformly applicable to every revealed
proﬁle of individual preference orderings over the set of culmination outcomes,
is identiﬁed.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
1.1 Historical Background
Ever since Sen (1970, Chapter 6 & Chapter 6*; 1970a; 1976; 1983) acutely
crystallized the logical conﬂict between the welfaristic outcome morality in the
weak form of the Pareto principle and the non-welfaristic claim of libertarian
rights into the impossibility of a Paretian liberal, a huge literature has evolved
along several distinct avenues.1 In the ﬁrst place, some of the early litera-
ture either repudiated the importance of Sen’s impossibility theorem, or tried
to ﬁnd an escape route from the logical impasse identiﬁed by Sen.2,3 In the
second place, capitalizing on the seminal observation by Nozick (1974, pp.164-
166), alternative articulations of libertarian rights, which are game-theoretic
in nature, were proposed by G¨ ardenfors (1981), Sugden (1985), Gaertner, Pat-
tanaik and Suzumura (1992), Deb (1990/2004; 1994), Hammond (1995; 1996)
and Peleg (1998). Recollect that Sen’s original articulation of libertarian rights
was in terms of the preference-contingent constraints on social choice rules by
1Some of these literature are succinctly surveyed and evaluated by Suzumura (1996;
2005).
2Representative work along these lines include Bernholz (1974), Gibbard (1974), Nozick
(1974, pp.164-166), Blau (1975), Osborne (1975), Seidl (1975), Farrell (1976), and Buchanan
(1976/1996). Sen (1976, 1992) commented on, and in some cases rejected, these early
proposals. See also Sen (2002, Part VI) for his more recent evaluation on the issues of
freedom and social choice.
3In the recent literature, Samet and Schmeidler (2003) characterized the liberal rule
within the class of what they call consent rules. Since the consent rules are speciﬁct y p e s
of voting rules, it is quite natural, as Samet and Schmeidler (2003) pointed out, that the
liberal rule in their model has a similar property with those discussed in Gibbard (1974).
2means of individual decisiveness.4 In contrast, these game-theoretic articula-
tions captured the essence of libertarian rights by means of individual freedom
of choosing admissible strategies in the game-theoretic situations where indi-
vidual liberties are at stake. Unlike the ﬁrst class of work, these game-theoretic
articulations were meant to provide more legitimate methods of capturing the
essence of what libertarian rights should mean.5 In the third place, the crucial
problem of initial conferment of libertarian rights was often mentioned in the
literature without providing a fully-ﬂedged analytical framework.6 Suﬃce it
to cite just one salient example. In his rebuttal to the game-form articulation
proposed by Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura (1992), Sen (1992, p.155) con-
4Suppose that there are two social states, say x and y, which diﬀer only in somebody’s
personal matters and nothing else. If the person in question prefers x to y,t h e nS e n
would confer on him the decisive power of rejecting the social choice of y from any social
opportunity set in which x is available.
5Note that these alternative articulations of libertarian rights do not claim to resolve the
impossibility of a Paretian liberal. As a matter of fact, Pattanaik (1996), and Deb, Pattanaik
and Razzolini (1997) showed that there are several natural variants of the impossibility of a
Paretian liberal even when libertarian rights are articulated in terms of game forms.
6Pattanaik and Suzumura (1994; 1996) and Suzumura (1996; 2005) identiﬁed three dis-
tinct issues in the analysis of libertarian rights. The ﬁrst issue is the formal structure of
rights. The second issue is the realization of conferred rights. The third issue is the initial
conferment of rights. In Sen’s theory of libertarian rights, the formal structure of rights was
articulated in terms of the preference-contingent constraints on social choice rules, whereas
the issue of the realization of conferred rights could be boiled down to the existence of a
social choice rule which respects the preference-contingent constraints on social choice rules.
However, Sen has never addressed himself to the issue of initial conferment of rights. This
is presumably because his interest was focussed squarely on the conﬂict between the non-
welfaristic claim of libertarian rights and the welfaristic claim of the Pareto principle, so
that it was unnecessary for him to develop a fully-ﬂedged theory of the initial conferment
of libertarian rights.
3cluded with the following observation: “Gaertner et al. (1992) do, in fact, pose
the question, ‘How does the society decide which strategies should or should
not be admissible for a speciﬁc player in a given context?’ This, as they rightly
note, is ‘an important question’. ... [I]t is precisely on the answer to this fur-
ther question that the relationship between the game-form formulations and
social-choice formulations depend ... . We must not be too impressed by the
‘form’ of the ‘game forms’. We have to examine its contents and its rationale.
The correspondence with social-choice formulations becomes transparent pre-
cisely there.” The purpose of this paper is to contribute to this less cultivated
issue within the theory of libertarian rights.
1.2 Basic Problem
To illustrate the nature of the problem of initial conferment of game-form
rights, consider the following example.
Example 1: There are two passengers 1 and 2 in a train’s compartment, where
1 is a smoker and 2 is a non-smoker. The train company is contemplating
whether to respect the smoker0s desire to smoke freely, or to respect the non-
smoker0s desire not to be imposed secondary smoking by the smoker. The
company0s problem is to choose from the set of various game forms, which
includes the following two game forms.




2 ,g γ)i sd e ﬁned by M
γ
1 = {s,ns},
where s = “to smoke” and ns =“ n o tt os m o k e ” ,M
γ
2 = {(l|s,r|ns),r},w h e r e
(l|s,r|ns) = “to leave the compartment if the smoker smokes, to remain in
the compartment if the smoker does not smoke” and r = “to remain in the








where (s,l)i st h eculmination outcome such that the smoker smokes and the
non-smoker leaves the compartment, and (ns,r)a n d( s,r) may be interpreted
similarly.




2 ,g γ∗)i sd e ﬁned by M
γ∗
1 = {(s|p,ns|
np),ns},w h e r e( s|p,ns|np) = “to smoke if the non-smoker permits it, not to
smoke if the non-smoker does not permit it” and ns = “not to smoke no matter
what”, M
γ∗
2 = {p · r,p · l,np},w h e r ep · r = “to permit the smoker to smoke
and remain in the compartment”, p · l = “to permit the smoker to smoke and
leave the compartment if and only if the smoker indeed smokes” and np =
“not to permit the smoker to smoke”, and gγ∗ is deﬁned by
1









Note that the set of culmination outcomes is given by A = {(s,l),(ns,r),(s,
r)}. Note also that the company confers on the smoker (resp. the non-smoker)
the right for free smoking (resp.t h er i g h tf o rc l e a na i r )i fi tc h o o s e st h eg a m e
form γ (resp. γ∗).
The gist of this example is that the social choice of a game form is tanta-
mount to the initial conferment of individual rights. This social choice issue
should be solved by designing and implementing a democratic social decision
procedure for initial conferment of individual rights.
5This analysis can be based on the conceptual framework developed by
Pattanaik and Suzumura (1994; 1996), which proposed to capture the intuitive
conception of decision-making procedure as a carrier of intrinsic value beyond
the instrumental usefulness thereof in realizing valuable culmination outcomes.
The model of social decision-making consists of two stages. In the ﬁrst stage,
the society decides on the game-form rights to be promulgated. In the second
stage, the promulgated game-form rights, coupled with the proﬁle of individual
preference orderings over the set of culmination outcomes, determine a fully-
ﬂedged game, and the play of this game determines a culmination outcome at
the Nash equilibrium.
We may illustrate this two-stage framework by means of Example 1. Sup-
pose that the two passengers have their own preference orderings over the set of
culmination outcomes A, together forming the following proﬁle R =( R1,R 2):
R1 :( s,l) Â1 (s,r) Â1 (ns,r);R2 :( ns,r) Â2 (s,l) Â2 (s,r),
where a Âi b denotes that i ∈ {1,2} prefers a to b. Given this proﬁle R,( s,l)
is the unique pure strategy Nash equilibirum outcome of the game (γ,R),
whereas (ns,r) is the unique pure strategy Nash equilibirum outcome of the
game (γ∗,R).
In the ﬁrst stage of social decision-making procedure, which is to choose a
game form from the set of admissible game forms including γ and γ∗,e a c ha n d
every individual is assumed to have an ordering function Qi, which assigns
an extended ordering Qi (R) over the pairs of game forms and realized culmi-
nation outcomes to the proﬁle R. For example, ((ns,r),γ∗)Qi (R)((s,l),γ)
implies that the social situation where (ns,r) is realized as a Nash equilib-
rium outcome of the game (γ∗,R) is at least as desirable for i as the social
situation where (s,l) is realized as a Nash equilibrium outcome of the game
6(γ,R). Let Ψ be the social aggregator to be called the extended constitution
function, which maps each admissible proﬁle of individual ordering functions
into a social ordering function, where an individual or a social ordering func-
tion speciﬁes an individual or a social preference ordering over the set of pairs
of culmination outcomes and game forms for each proﬁle of individual prefer-
ence orderings over the set of culmination outcomes. It is this social ordering
function that determines the game-form rights to be socially chosen and pro-
mulgated as the rule of the game to be played in the second stage. For the
sake of further argument, let γ∗ be the game form which is chosen by means
of the social ordering Q(R)=Ψ(Q1(R),Q 2(R)).
Let us turn now to the second stage of the two-stage social decision-making
procedure. Since γ∗ is assumed to be chosen by means of Q(R) when the proﬁle
R is revealed, the two individuals play the game (γ∗,R) in the second stage,
and the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome (ns,r)w i l le m e r g e
as a consequence. It may deserve emphasis that this two-stage social choice
procedure has a sharply contrasting feature vis-` a-vis the classical Arrow social
choice framework. In the Arrow framework, it is the culmination outcome
that is socially chosen, whereas the two-stage social choice framework ` al a
Pattanaik and Suzumura visualizes a procedure where it is the game-form right
that is socially chosen, and the culmination outcome is determined through
the decentralized play of the game.
Given this scenario of the two-stage social decision-making procedure, the
crucial task in the analysis of social choice of game form rights is to show the
existence of a reasonable extended constitution function Ψ.I nt h i sp a p e r ,w e
will introduce some axioms on Ψ to identify the conditions which qualiﬁes an
extended constitution function to be reasonable. Also, we will propose some
7conditions which identify the class of liberal game forms. Since the concept of
game forms itself has very little, if any, to do with liberal rights-structures, we
should discuss what conditions are needed to characterize the liberal rights-
structures. To sum up, our purpose in this paper is to investigate the possibility
of reasonable extended constitution functions, in terms of which a liberal game
form can be rationalized.
1.3 Other Related Literature
A motivation similar to ours is pursued in Koray (2000). Both Koray (2000)
and the present paper address themselves to the social choice of social decision
rules. One of the crucial diﬀerences is that the social decision rules envisaged
by Koray are the conventional social choice functions, whereas we focus on
the social decision rules as game forms. Another diﬀerence is that Koray
(2000) was concerned only about the consequential values of social decision
rules, whereas we are interested in both the consequential values and non-
consequential values of social decision rules as game forms. It may also be
worth noting that the main result of Koray (2000) is an impossibility theorem,
whereas our main results are possibility theorems. This contrast is mainly due
to the existence of social concerns about the non-consequential values of game
forms in our framework.
Apart from this introduction, the paper consists of four sections and an ap-
pendix. Section 2 explains our basic model of extended social alternatives and
game form rights. It also deﬁnes the extended constitution function. Section 3
introduces the basic Arrovian axioms which identify democratic extended con-
stitution functions, and explains what we mean by game forms being liberal.
Section 4 asserts the existence of an extended constitution function which
8enables the society to decide on the initial conferment of game-form rights.
Section 5 concludes, and Appendix gathers all the involved proofs.
2B a s i c M o d e l
2.1 Description of Social States
The society consists of n individuals, where 2 ≤ n<+∞.Ndenotes the set
of all individuals, viz. N = {1, ···,i,···,n},w h i c hi sﬁxed throughout this
paper. Let A be the set of feasible social states.I nw h a tf o l l o w s ,i ti sa s s u m e d
that 3 ≤ #A<+∞.
For each individual i ∈ N, Ri ⊆ A × A denotes i0s (weak) preference
ordering deﬁned over A.F o r a n y x,y ∈ A,(x,y) ∈ Ri means that x is at
least as good as y from i0sv i e w p o i n t .P (Ri)a n dI (Ri) denote, respectively,
the strict preference relation and the indiﬀerence relation corresponding to
Ri.T h u s ,( x,y) ∈ P (Ri) if and only if [(x,y) ∈ Ri &( y,x) / ∈ Ri], and (x,y)
∈ I (Ri) if and only if [(x,y) ∈ Ri &( y,x) ∈ Ri]. R denotes the universal
set of preference orderings deﬁned over A.A n n-tuple R =( R1,R 2, ···,R n)
of individual preference orderings, one ordering for each individual i ∈ N,
is called a proﬁle of individual preference orderings over A. Rn denotes the
universal set of logically conceivable proﬁles.
To articulate individual rights within our framework, we introduce rights-
systems as game forms. A game form is a pair γ =( M,g), where M ≡
Q
i∈N Mi and Mi denotes a set of permissible strategies for individual i ∈ N,
and g : M → A is an outcome function which speciﬁes, for each strategy
proﬁle m ∈ M, a feasible outcome g(m) ∈ A. Moreover, we assume that g is
surjective, viz., g (M)=A. The universal set of game forms is denoted by Γ.
9Given a proﬁle R ∈ Rn and a game form γ =( M,g) ∈ Γ,ap a i r( γ,R)
deﬁnes a non-cooperative game. Throughout this paper, we adopt the Nash
equilibrium concept. Given a game (γ,R), a strategy proﬁle m∗ ∈ M is







∈ Ri holds for all i ∈ N and all mi ∈ Mi.7 The set of
all Nash equilibria of the game (γ,R)i sd e n o t e db y²NE(γ,R). A conceivable
social outcome x∗ ∈ A is called a Nash equilibrium outcome of the game (γ,R)
if there exists a Nash equilibrium m∗ ∈ ²NE(γ,R) satisfying x∗ = g(m∗).
The set of all Nash equilibrium outcomes of the game (γ,R) is denoted by
τNE(γ,R).
2.2 Social Decision Procedure for Rule Selection
Let us visualize the two-stage social decision procedure in the general setting.
To begin with, every individual expresses his value judgements on the social
desirability of alternative methods of conferring game-form rights. Then, all
individuals engage in debates about each other0s value judgements, providing
justiﬁcations for their own values, and oﬀering criticisms of values held by oth-
ers. Sooner or later, there comes a stage where debate must stop and action
must be taken by the society. In the primordial stage of rule selection,t h e
social decision is made on the rights-system to be promulgated by aggregat-
ing the individuals0 value judgements regarding the initial rights-conferment
through some democratic social decision procedure. After the rights-system as
ag a m ef o r mγ ∈ Γ is promulgated, and the proﬁle of individual preference or-
7For every i ∈ N,a n de v e r ym ∈ M, m−i ≡ (m1,···,m i−1,m i+1,···,m n)a n d
M−i ≡ Πj6=iMj. For every i ∈ N,e v e r ym0




10derings R ∈ Rn on the set of culmination outcomes is revealed, a fully-ﬂedged
game (γ,R)i sp l a y e di nt h erealization stage of the conferred game-form
rights, which determines a Nash equilibrium social outcome x∗ ∈ τNE(γ,R)i f
τNE(γ,R) 6= ∅.
To make this scenario precise, we invoke the extended social choice frame-
work introduced by Pattanaik and Suzumura (1994; 1996).8 Let Γ∗ denote the
admissible class of game forms. For every x ∈ A and every γ ∈ Γ∗,ap a i r
(x,γ) ∈ A × Γ∗ is called an extended (social) alternative.G i v e nap r o ﬁle R ∈
Rn, an extended alternative (x,γ)i ss a i dt ob erealizable under R if and only
if x ∈ τNE(γ,R). The intended interpretation is that the social outcome x is
realized through the exercise of the rights-system γ when the proﬁle R prevails.
In what follows, Λ(R) denotes the set of all realizable extended alternatives
under R, viz.,
Λ(R)={(x,γ) | x ∈ τNE(γ,R)&γ ∈ Γ
∗}.
The social decision procedure is formulated as follows. First, each indi-
vidual i0s value judgements on the desirability of rights-systems is assumed to
be represented by an ordering function Qi : Rn ³ (A × Γ∗)2 such that, for
8This extended social choice framework ` a la Pattanaik and Suzumura capitalizes on
the insightful observation by Arrow (1963, pp.89-90) to the following eﬀect: “Up to now,
no attempt has been made to ﬁnd guidance by considering the components of the vector
which deﬁnes the social state. One especially interesting analysis of this sort considers that,
among the variables which taken together deﬁne the social state, one is the very process by
which the society makes its choice. This is especially important if the mechanism of choice
itself has a value to the individuals in the society. For example, an individual may have a
positive preference for achieving a given distribution through the free market mechanism over
achieving the same distribution through rationing by the government.” See, also, Suzumura
(1996; 1999; 2000; 2005).
11each R ∈ Rn, Qi(R) ⊆ Λ(R) × Λ(R) is a complete and transitive relation
(ordering) deﬁned over Λ(R). P (Qi(R)) and I (Qi(R)) stand for the asym-
metric part and the symmetric part of Qi(R), respectively. By deﬁnition,
((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ Qi(R), or (x,γ)Qi(R)(x0,γ0)f o rt h es a k eo fb r e v i t y ,m e a n s
that, according to i0s judgements, having a social outcome x through the play
of the game (γ,R) is at least as good for the society as having a social out-
come x0 through the play of the game (γ0,R). Let Q be the set of all logically
possible ordering functions.
In the second place, the democratic procedure for aggregating individual
v a l u ej u d g e m e n t si sd e ﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1: An extended constitution function (ECF) is a function Ψ which
maps each and every proﬁle of individual ordering functions Q =( Qi)i∈N in
an appropriate domain ∆Ψ ⊆ Qn into a social ordering function Q, viz.,
Ψ(Q)=Q ∈ Q for every Q ∈ ∆Ψ.
The concept of extended constitution function is due originally to Pat-
tanaik and Suzumura (1996), which is a natural extension of the Arrovian
social welfare function or constitution function [Arrow (1963)]. Note that, in
the present framework as well as in the framework of Pattanaik and Suzu-
mura (1996), there are two types of individual preference orderings. One is an
individual0s preference ordering Ri over A, which represents i0s subjective tastes
over the set of culmination outcomes, and the other is i0s ordering function Qi,
which represents i0s value judgements over the set of extended alternatives.9
9Note that the individual ordering function does not have to be ethical in nature. It
may generate an extended preference ordering which is selﬁsh in nature, where Qi expresses
i0s selﬁsh judgements if and only if, for every R ∈ Rn and every (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R),
((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ Qi(R)( r e s p .P (Qi(R))) if and only if (x,x0) ∈ Ri (resp. P (Ri)) holds.
12The latter preferences constitute the informational basis of the ECF to select
a rights-system in the primordial stage of rule selection, whereas the former
preferences constitute the informational basis for realizing a feasible social
outcome in the realization stage of conferred game-form rights.
When an ECF Ψ is speciﬁed, we can deﬁne the associated rational social
choice function as follows. For each proﬁle of individual ordering functions
Q ∈ ∆Ψ, Ψ determines a social ordering function Q = Ψ(Q) which, in turn,
determines the set of best extended social alternatives for each R ∈ Rn by
(1) BQ(R) ≡ {(x,γ) ∈ Λ(R) | ∀(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R): ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ Q(R)},
where Q = Ψ(Q). The set of game forms chosen through Ψ is then given by
(2) CΨ(Q;R) ≡ {γ ∈ Γ∗ | ∃ x ∈ A :( x,γ) ∈ BQ(R)},
where Q = Ψ(Q). In what follows, CΨ is called the rational social choice
function chosen through Ψ.
3 Basic Axioms
3.1 Democratic Conditions for Extended Constitution
Functions
As one of the desirable properties to be satisﬁe db yt h er a t i o n a ls o c i a lc h o i c e
function chosen through Ψ, we introduce the following condition.
Uniformity of Rational Choice (URC): For every Q ∈ ∆Ψ,
∩R∈RnCΨ(Q;R) 6= ∅,
13where Q = Ψ(Q).
If the Condition URC is satisﬁed and a game form γ∗ ∈∩ R∈RnCΨ(Q;R)
is chosen, γ∗ applies uniformly to each and every future realization of R ∈ Rn.
Since the game form is nothing other than the formal method of specifying
the distribution of rights in the society prior to the realization of the proﬁle of
individual preference orderings over culmination outcomes, it seems desirable,
if at all possible, to design the extended constitution function Ψ satisfying
the condition URC.N o t et h a ti fw ei m p l e m e n taγ∗ ∈∩ R∈RnCΨ(Q;R), then
γ∗ prevails as the basic rights-system no matter how frivolously the proﬁle R
undergoes a change.10
O u rn e x tr e q u i r e m e n to nΨ is that it is minimally democratic in the sense
that the unanimous individual value judgements must be faithfully reﬂected
in the social value judgements in the following Paretian senses.
Strong Pareto Principle (SP): For every Q ∈ ∆Ψ, every R ∈ Rn, and
every (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R),
((x,γ),(x
0,γ
0)) ∈ (∩i∈NQi(R))∩(∪i∈NP (Qi(R))) ⇒ ((x,γ),(x
0,γ
0)) ∈ P(Q(R)),
where Q = Ψ(Q).
Pareto Indiﬀerence Principle (PI): For every Q ∈ ∆Ψ, every R ∈ Rn,
and every (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R),
10It is true that the condition URC is strong, as it requires that the promulgated rules of
the game remains insensitive to the unforeseen changes in the individual preference order-
ings on the set of culmination outcomes. As a reﬂection of this fact, the conditions which
guarantee the satisfaction of the condition URC cannot but be stringent and go beyond the
consequentialist border of informational constraints.
14((x,γ),(x
0,γ
0)) ∈∩ i∈NI(Qi(R)) ⇒ ((x,γ),(x
0,γ
0)) ∈ I(Q(R)),
where Q = Ψ(Q).
The next requirement is a version of the independence of irrelevant alter-
natives [Arrow (1963)] in the framework of extended alternatives.
Independence (I): For every R ∈ Rn, every Q, Q0 ∈ ∆Ψ, and every (x,γ),
(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), if
((x,γ),(x
0,γ





holds for all i ∈ N, then
((x,γ),(x
0,γ




h o l d sa sw e l l , where Q = Ψ(Q) and Q0 = Ψ(Q0).
For every R ∈ Rn and given an ECF Ψ, an individual d ∈ N is called an
R-dictator under Ψ if, for every Q ∈ ∆Ψ and every (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R),
((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P(Qd(R)) implies ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P(Q(R)), where Q =
Ψ(Q). We are now ready to introduce the last democratic requirement on Ψ
as follows.
Non-Dictatorship (ND): For every R ∈ Rn, there is no R-dictator under
Ψ.
Note that the above four requirements on the extended constitution func-
tion are natural extensions of the Arrovian axioms on the standard Arrovian
constitution function [Arrow (1963)], except for the parametric role played by
the proﬁle R in the deﬁnition of a dictator under Ψ. In this arena, each and
every proﬁle R is a necessary datum for identifying a social choice environment
and the domain Λ(R) of individual and social ordering functions.
153.2 Nash Solvability, Minimal Liberalism, and Eﬃciency
In this subsection, we discuss some properties of a rights-system as a game
form. They embody a property of stability in social decision-making, a prop-
erty of minimal liberalism, and a property of outcome morality, respectively.
The ﬁrst property is due to van Hees (1999), which is well-known in game
theory as the Nash solvability of a game form.
Deﬁnition 2: Ag a m ef o r mγ ∈ Γ∗ is Nash-solvable if τNE(γ,R) is non-
empty for each and every proﬁle R ∈ Rn.
Let ΓNS denote the subclass of Γ which consists solely of the Nash-solvable
game forms.
The Nash-solvability plays an important role in the game form formulation
of libertarian rights. Indeed, Peleg (1998) formulated the Gibbard paradox in
the game form formulation by means of the fact that the game form is not
Nash-solvable. Furthermore, Peleg, Peters and Storchen (2002) identiﬁed a
necessary and suﬃcient condition for the Nash solvability so as to provide a
resolution of the Gibbard paradox.
The second property is related to the intrinsic value of libertarian rights.
As an auxiliary step, let us introduce the α-eﬀectivity function of a game
form, which gives us information on the (veto) power structure which a game
form assigns to individuals. Given a game form γ =( M,g), the associated α-
eﬀectivity function Eγ can be deﬁned by Eγ(∅)=∅ and, for each and every




B ⊆ A | ∃mS =( mi)i∈S ∈ MS,∀mN\S ∈ MN\S : g(mS,mN\S) ∈ B
ª
,
where MS ≡ Πi∈SMi for every S ⊆ N. The universal class of α-eﬀectivity
16functions associated with Γ∗ is denoted by E (Γ∗). Since N and A are ﬁnite
sets, E (Γ∗)i sa l s oﬁnite.
By using the α-eﬀectivity function of a game form, let us deﬁne two types
of game forms:
Deﬁnition 3: Ag a m ef o r mγ =( M,g) ∈ Γ∗ is dictatorial i ft h e r ee x i s t sa
unique individual i ∈ N, to be called the dictator of γ, such that Eγ (i)=
2A\{∅} and Eγ (j)={A} for every j 6= i. A dictatorial game form in which
i ∈ N is the dictator is called the i-dictatorial game form.
For each i ∈ N, Γ(i) denotes the set of all i-ditatorial game forms.
Deﬁnition 4 [Peleg (1998)]: A game form γ =( M,g) ∈ Γ∗ satisﬁes minimal
liberalism if there exist at least two individuals i,j ∈ N such that there are
Bi ∈ Eγ (i) and Bj ∈ Eγ (j) with Bi 6= A 6= Bj.
Note that the requisite of minimal liberalism is actually the minimal condition
for individual rights to embody the value of individual liberty.11 As a matter
of fact, this requisite of minimal liberalism may not be attractive in more-
than-two-person society, as it is compatible with the possibility of duopolistic
distributions of eﬀective powers in the presence of numerous individuals with
no power whatsoever. To avoid such a duopolistic situation in more-than-two-
person society, let us introduce a slightly stronger version of minimal liberalism.
11There have been some other proposed conditions for libertarian rights in the game form
formulation of rights. Two Independent Vetoesk and Dichotomous Veto Powersk by Deb,
Pattanaik, and Razzolini (1997), and Maximal Freedom by van Hees (1999) are two salient
examples thereof.
17Deﬁnition 5: A game form γ =( M,g) ∈ Γ∗ is said to be liberal if each and
every individual i ∈ N has an eﬀective power in the sense that there exists
Bi ∈ Eγ (i) such that Bi 6= A.
Let ΓL denote the subclass of Γ which consists solely of liberal game forms.
The third property is on the consequentialist value of rights-systems.
Deﬁnition 6: Ag a m ef o r mγ ∈ Γ∗ is eﬃcient if, for each and every pro-
ﬁle R ∈ Rn, there exists a Pareto eﬃcient Nash equilibrium outcome in A
whenever τNE(γ,R) is non-empty.
L e tu sd e n o t et h es e to fe ﬃcient game forms by ΓPE.
This condition is particularly relevant in the context of liberal paradox in
the game form formulation of individual rights. Recollect that Deb, Pattanaik,
and Razzolini (1997) proposed two notions of liberal paradox: strong liberal
paradox and weak liberal paradox. The former says that, for some preference
proﬁle, every Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto ineﬃcient, whereas the latter
says that, for some preference proﬁle, there is a Nash equilibrium outcome
which is Pareto ineﬃcient. According to this classiﬁcation, the existence of an
eﬃcient game form deﬁned above resolves the strong paradox, but not the weak
paradox. Although the resolution of the weak paradox is preferable to that
of the strong one, it is a desideratum which is impossible to aspire for, since
any game form satisfying minimal liberalism should have a Pareto ineﬃcient
outcome for some preference proﬁle, as Peleg (1998) has shown.
We can show that there exists a game form which satisﬁes all of the above
three requisites.
Proposition 1: There exists a game form γ∗ ∈ ΓNS ∩ ΓL ∩ ΓPE.
18Note that Peleg, Peters and Storchen (2002) showed that the Nash solvability
is equivalent to the claim that, for every preference proﬁle, there exists a weakly
Pareto eﬃcient Nash equilibrium outcome. Since we are requiring not weak
Pareto eﬃciency, but strong Pareto eﬃciency, we cannot simply invoke their
equivalence theorem in the context of verifying the validity of Proposition 1.
4 Social Choice of Rights Systems through ECF
Under what domain restrictions on the acceptable class of proﬁles of individual
ordering functions can we construct an ECF which is not only consistent with
the four Arrovian axioms of SP, PI, I,a n dND, but also is capable of choosing
a liberal game form? What about the stringent, but highly desirable property
of uniformly rational choice of game-form rights? If URC is not satisﬁed,
the associated rational choice function may switch from one game form to the
other when the proﬁle R undergoes a frivolous change, which one may ﬁnd
rather disturbing.
In section 4.1, we deﬁne a subclass of individual ordering functions which
may be called the self-interested class, and examine the existence of an ECF
which is workable for every proﬁle of individual ordering functions within this
speciﬁed class. Although the answer to our question is still negative on this
restricted domain, we can show in section 4.2 that the answer turns out to be
positive if a suitable further restriction is introduced on the self-interested do-
main. In section 4.3, we ﬁnd another restricted domain on which the existence
of a democratic ECF is guaranteed. Unlike the ﬁrst two restricted domains,
this third type of restricted domain contains a class of ethical ordering func-
tions.
194.1 Self-Interested Domain Restriction
Let a subset S of Q be such that, for every i ∈ N, Qi ∈ S implies, for every
R ∈ Rn and every (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), that:
(a) if γ = γ0 holds, then ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ Qi (R) if and only if (x,x0) ∈ Ri;
and
(b) if x = x0 holds, then Eγ(i) ⊇ (resp. )) Eγ0(i) implies ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈
Qi(R)( r e s p .P(Qi(R))).
The meaning of the ﬁrst restriction (a) should be clear: whenever the two
extended alternatives (x,γ)a n d( x0,γ0) share the same game form γ = γ0,t h e n
the evaluation by Qi is in accordance with his personal preferences Ri on the
pair of culmination outcomes {x,x0}. It means that this individual transcribes
his selﬁsh preferences over the set of culmination outcomes at least partly
into his value judgements over the set of extended alternatives. The second
restriction (b) says that whenever the two extended alternatives (x,γ)a n d
(x0,γ0) share the same culmination outcome x = x0, Qi prefers the extended
alternative (x,γ) to another extended alternative (x0,γ0)a te v e r yR ∈ Rn
with (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R)a sl o n ga sγ endows i with more eﬀective power
than γ0 does. This implies, inter alia, that the individual i prefers i-dictatorial
game form to any other game form.
Let us illustrate how the above two conditions deﬁning S restrict the do-
main of ordering functions by another use of Example 1.
Example 2: Consider the problem of smoker and non-smoker in Example
1. Let us consider {γ,γ∗,γ1,γ2} ⊆ Γ∗,w h e r eγ and γ∗ are deﬁned as in
Example 1,a n dγ1 (resp. γ2)i st h e1 -( resp. 2-) dictatorial game form.
20Then, the α-eﬀectivity functions of these game forms are given by:
E
γ (1) = Ω({(s,l),(s,r)}) ∪ Ω({(ns,r)});
E








(1) = Ω({(s,l)}) ∪ Ω({(s,r)}) ∪ Ω({(ns,r)});E
γ1
(2) = {A};a n d
E
γ2
(1) = {A}; E
γ2
(2) = Ω({(s,l)}) ∪ Ω({(s,r)}) ∪ Ω({(ns,r)}),
where Ω(B) ≡ {B0 ⊆ A | B0 ⊇ B} for any B ⊆ A.
Take the proﬁle R =( R1,R 2) ∈ Rn which was deﬁn e di ns e c t i o n1 . 2 .
Then, {(s,l)} = τNE(γ;R), {(ns,r)} = τNE(γ∗;R), {(s,l)} = τNE(γ1;R),
and {(ns,r)} = τNE(γ2;R).



























Thus, any preference of individual 1 (resp. individual 2) over {((s,l),γ1),((s,l),
γ)} and {((ns,r),γ∗),((ns,r),γ2)} (resp. {((ns,r),γ2),((ns,r),γ∗)},a n d
{((s,l),γ),((s,l),γ1)}) is identical in the self-interested domain Sn.
We are now ready to state the following:
Theorem 1: Let ∆Ψ = Sn and Γ∗ = Γ. Then, for every Ψ which satisﬁes
SP, PI, and I, there exists d ∈ N such that CΨ(Ψ(Q);R)=CΨ(Qd;R) for
every Q ∈ Sn. Moreover, if Ψ satisﬁes URC, then the class of d-dictatorial
game forms is uniformly chosen, viz., Γ(d) ⊆∩ R∈RnCΨ(Ψ(Q);R) for every
Q ∈ Sn, and ∩Q∈Sn ∩R∈Rn CΨ(Ψ(Q);R)=Γ(d).
21The domain Sn is a strong restriction vis-` a-vis the universal domain Qn,
yet Theorem 1 shows that even in such a restricted domain, every ECF
Ψ satisfying the Pareto principles and independence condition should have
the dictatorial property in the sense that its associated rational social choice
function becomes dictatorial. Moreover, if Ψ satisﬁes URC,t h e ni tu n i f o r m l y
rationalizes only the dictatorial game forms. Nevertheless, the fact remains
that this kind of restricted domain Sn is plausible in the realistic context
of social choice. The regrettable message of Theorem 1 is that there is no
resolution of the emergence of dictatorship in the social choice of rights-systems
as long as the society consists solely of self-interested individuals.
4.2 How to Protect Liberal Rights on the Self-Interested
Domain
Although the previous subsection arrived at a pessimistic conclusion, there still
remains an interesting issue to be explored. Can a society with self-interested
individuals ﬁnd a method which confers a liberal rights-system through a non-
dictatorial social choice procedure? To answer this question in the aﬃrmative,
we must introduce a further restriction on the self-interested domain Sn.
As an auxiliary step, let us deﬁne, for each and every j ∈ N,as u b s e t
Γ0
j ⊆ Γ by
Γ
0




j consists of admissible game forms in which j is powerless.


















By construction, Γu(i) consists of admissible game forms in which somebody
other than i ∈ N is unprivileged in the sense of being powerless, whereas
Γp(i) consists of admissible game forms in which nobody other than i ∈ N is
unprivileged in the sense of being powerless.
With these auxiliary concepts at hand, we deﬁne a class of coalitions
Ni(Q) ⊆ 2N\{i},w h e r ei ∈ N and Q ∈ Sn, as follows: for every S ⊆
N\{i},S ∈ Ni(Q) if and only if, for every γ ∈ Γp(i), every γ0 ∈ Γu(i)w i t h
Eγ0(S)={A},e v e r yR,R0 ∈ Rn,e v e r y( x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), and every
(y,γ),(y0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R0), there exists at least one j ∈ S such that the following
condition is satisﬁed:
((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ Qj(R) ⇔ ((y,γ),(y0,γ0)) ∈ Qj(R0). (n-c)
In words, S ∈ Ni (Q)i m p l i e st h a ti fγ0 deprives all members in S of their
eﬀective power, and γ does not deprive any member in S of his/her eﬀective
power, then some member j ∈ S ranks at Qj the relative desirability of γ
at least as high as γ0, regardless of the culmination outcomes which γ and
γ0 may happen to bring about at R and R0, respectively. Thus, taking the
condition (b) of S into consideration, the set Ni (Q), where Q ∈ Sn,i st h e
class of coalitions, each element of which contains at least one member who
consistently values at Q, regardless of the culmination outcomes which may
happen to emerge, the protection of rights of all members of S higher than the
potential dictatorship by i.
23Example 3: Consider the problem of smoker and non-smoker in Exam-
ple 1 again. Let R ∈ Rn be the proﬁle deﬁned in section 1.2, and let
R0 ∈ Rn be the proﬁle such that every individual is universally indiﬀerent
over A = {(s,l),(s,r),(ns,r)}. In this case, any culmination outcome x ∈ A
is a Nash equilibrium outcome of the game (γ0,R0) for any γ0 ∈ Γ∗.T a k e
any Q ∈ Sn. By virtue of the condition (b) of the self-interested domain,
(((s,l),γ1),((s,l),γ2) ∈ P(Q1(R0)), whereas the condition (a) of the self-
interested domain brings about (((s,l),γ2),((ns,r),γ2)) ∈ I(Q1(R0)). Q1(R0)
being transitive, we then obtain (((s,l),γ1),((ns,r),γ2)) ∈ P(Q1(R0)). Simi-
lar reasoning leads us to
(((s,l),γ),((ns,r),γ2)) ∈ P (Q1 (R0)); and
(((ns,r),γ2),((s,l),γ1)),(((ns,r),γ∗),((s,l),γ1)) ∈ P (Q2 (R0)).
Thus, it follows from the (n-c) condition that we have
{1} ∈ N2 (Q) ⇒ (((s,l),γ1),((ns,r),γ2)),(((s,l),γ),((ns,r),γ2))
∈ P (Q1 (R));
{2} ∈ N1 (Q) ⇒ (((ns,r),γ2),((s,l),γ1)),(((ns,r),γ∗),((s,l),γ1))
∈ P (Q2 (R))
for any Q ∈ Sn.M o r e o v e r ,f o ra n yQ ∈ Sn and any R0 ∈ Rn,w eh a v e :
{1} ∈ N2 (Q) ⇒ ((x,γ1),(x0,γ2)),((x00,γ),(x0,γ2)),((x000,γ∗),(x0,γ2))
∈ P (Q1 (R));
{2} ∈ N1 (Q) ⇒ ((x0,γ2),(x,γ1)),((x00,γ),(x,γ1)),((x000,γ∗),(x,γ1))
∈ P (Q1 (R))
whenever (x,γ1),(x0,γ2),(x00,γ),(x000,γ∗) ∈ Λ(R)f o ra n yx,x0,x00,x000 ∈ A.
24Thus, {1} ∈ N2 (Q) implies that individual 1 values at Q the protection of
his own rights than the potential dictatorship by individual 2, in the sense that
any extended alternative with the 2-dictatorial game form γ2 is ranked worst
by Q1, no matter what culmination outcome is realized as a Nash equilibrium
outcome under γ2. The same statement applies to {2} ∈ N1 (Q).
Then we may assert the following:
Theorem 2: Let Γ∗ = Γ. For any i ∈ N, there exists an ECF Ψ with
∆Ψ ⊆ Sn satisfying SP, PI, I, and ND such that CΨ(Ψ(Q);R) 6= ∅ and
CΨ(Ψ(Q);R) ⊆ ΓNS ∩ ΓL ∩ ΓPE hold for every Q ∈ ∆Ψ and every R ∈ Rn if
∩Q∈∆ΨNi(Q) ⊇ 2N\{i}\{∅} holds.
Remark: Although the condition stated in Theorem 2 is only a suﬃcient
condition for the existence of an ECF with the asserted properties, it turns
out to be a necessary condition as well if the domain ∆Ψ of an ECF is rich
enough. The exact statement of the required domain richness condition and
the proof of the asserted necessity may be obtained from the authors upon
request.
In the domain ∆Ψ of Theorem 2, every individual other than i insists that
the complete deprivation of his rights should be rejected, regardless of the
social choice environment which prevails within Rn and regardless of the cul-
mination outcomes . If every individual other than i always reveals such a
strong view against the social decision-making in accordance with the poten-
tial dictatorship by i,t h e nh i sr i g h ti nt e r m so fe ﬀective power can be pro-
tected through the democratic social decision procedure Ψ.S i n c e t h e g a m e
form γ∗ ∈ CΨ(Ψ(Q);R)i ss u c ht h a tγ∗ ∈ ΓNS ∩ ΓL ∩ ΓPE, γ∗ is not only
non-dictatorial, but also confers liberty on every individual, i inclusive.
25Observe, however, that this theorem falls short of guaranteeing the uniform
rational choice of a liberal game form. To secure this uniformity property, we
must consider another domain restriction. Given Γp (i)a n dSn,d e ﬁne a class
of coalitions Mi(Q) ⊆ 2N as follows: for any S ⊆ N, S ∈ Mi(Q)i fa n do n l y
if, for every γ,γ0 ∈ Γp(i), every R, R0 ∈ Rn,e v e r y( x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), and
every (y,γ),(y0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R0), there exists at least one individual j ∈ S such
that Qj satisﬁes the condition (n-c). Then:
Theorem 3: Let Γ∗ = Γ. For any i ∈ N, there exists an ECF Ψ with
∆Ψ ⊆ Sn satisfying SP, PI, I, and ND such that ∅ 6= ∩R∈RnCΨ(Ψ(Q);R) ⊆
ΓNS ∩ ΓL ∩ ΓPE holds for every Q ∈ ∆Ψ if ∩Q∈∆ΨNi(Q) ⊇ 2N\{i}\{∅} and
{i} ∈∩ Q∈∆ΨMi(Q)h o l d .
According to Theorem 3, if every individual has only the non-consequential
preferences on rights-systems, it is not only possible to resolve the Arrovian
impossibility impasse, but it is also possible to protect every individual0s lib-
erty in terms of eﬀective power, and to choose uniformly rational, liberal,
Nash-solvable, and Pareto eﬃcient game form as a rights-system.
4.3 Ethical Individuals and Liberal Social Ordering Func-
tions
In this subsection, we go beyond the self-interested class of individual ordering
functions and introduce the possibility of ethical individual ordering functions.
In so doing, we look for the domain restrictions on ECFsu n d e rw h i c ha n
ethical social ordering function can be derived without violating the Arrovian
axioms.
26To begin with, we introduce a condition for social ordering functions to be
liberal as follows.
Deﬁnition 7: An ordering function Q ∈ Q is said to be liberal if and only
if, for every R ∈ Rn and for whatever (x,γ), (x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), γ ∈ ΓL and
γ0 ∈ Γ \ ΓL necessarily imply ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P(Q(R)).
The idea behind this deﬁnition is simple. An ordering function which respects
the intrinsic value of individual liberty should give every liberal game form
the absolute priority over any other non-liberal game form no matter what
culmination outcomes they may respectively bring about. In what follows, the
class of liberal ordering functions will be denoted by QL.
Next, we deﬁne a condition which qualiﬁes an ordering function to be not
only liberal, but also non-consequentialist liberal as follows.
Deﬁnition 8: An ordering function Q ∈ Q is non-consequentialist liberal
if and only if Q ∈ QL and, for every γ,γ0 ∈ ΓL, every R,R0 ∈ Rn, ev-
ery (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R) and every (y,γ),(y0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R0), Q satisﬁes the
condition (n-c).
It may deserve emphasis that a non-consequentialist liberal ordering function is
one which embodies two distinct features of non-consequentialism. In the ﬁrst
place, it embodies a feature of non-consequentialism in the sense that a liberal
game form, which confers some eﬀective power on each and every individual,
is judged strictly better than an illiberal game form, which does not do so,
no matter what consequences they may respectively bring about.I nt h es e c o n d
place, it embodies another feature of non-consequentialism in the following
sense: if both γ and γ0 are liberal game forms, attaining a consequence x ∈
27τNE(γ,R) through the play of the game (γ,R)i sj u d g e da tl e a s ta sg o o d
as attaining a consequence x0 ∈ τNE(γ0,R) through the play of the game
(γ0,R) in terms of the ordering Q(R) if and only if attaining a consequence
y ∈ τNE(γ,R0) through the play of the game (γ,R0)i sj u d g e da tl e a s ta s
good as attaining a consequence y0 ∈ τNE(γ0,R0) through the play of the game
(γ0,R0) in terms of the ordering Q(R0). In what follows, the class of non-
consequentialist liberal ordering functions is denoted by QNCL. It is clear that
QNCL ⊆ QL.
We are now ready to discuss the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the
existence of ECFs which not only satisfy the Arrovian conditions, but also
always generate non-consequentialist liberal ordering functions.
To begin with, let us deﬁne a subclass F ( Q as follows: Q ∈ F holds if
and only if the following two conditions hold for any (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R):
(a) if x = x0 holds, then
¡




(b) if x = x0 holds, then
¡
∀h ∈ N: Eγ (h) ⊇ Eγ0 (h)&∃j ∈ N: Eγ (j) ) Eγ0 (j)
¢
implies((x, γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P (Q(R)).
This restricted class of ordering functions embodies ethical value judgements
in the following sense. According to the deﬁning condition (a) [resp.(b)] of
F,Qjudges that, if all individuals0 liberties in terms of eﬀective power do not
decrease [resp. do not decrease with at least one individual0s liberty being
strictly increasing], it is not a worse [resp. a better] change. This is essentially
the ethical value judgements, which is motivated by the notion of Maximal
Freedom introduced by van Hees (1999). Using F, let us deﬁne
(F,Q−i) ≡ Q×...×Q | {z }
(i−1)-times
×F×Q×...×Q | {z }
(n−i)-times
,
28which will serve as a crucial domain restriction in our subsequent possibility
theorems.
As an auxiliary step in deﬁning two crucial families of subsets of N, K(Q)
and L(Q), for each and every Q ∈ Qn, let a class of ordering functions T ⊆ Q
be deﬁned by
T ≡ {Q ∈ Q|∃Q
0 ∈ S : Q and Q
0 coincide on (A × ΓL) × (A × (Γ\ΓL))}.
For every Q ∈ Qn,l e tac l a s sK(Q)o fs u b s e t so fN be deﬁned as follows:
for every S ⊆ N, S ∈ K(Q) if and only if, for every γ ∈ ΓL and γ0 ∈ Γ\ΓL
with Eγ0(S)={A},e v e r yR,R0 ∈ Rn,e v e r y( x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R) and every
(y,γ),(y0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R0), there exists at least one individual j ∈ S such that
Qj ∈ T satisﬁes the condition (n-c). Likewise, a class of coalitions L(Q) ⊆
2N is deﬁned as follows: for every S ⊆ N, S ∈ L(Q) if and only if, for
every γ,γ0 ∈ ΓL,e v e r yR,R0 ∈ Rn,e v e r y( x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R) and every
(y,γ),(y0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R0), there exists at least one individual j ∈ S such that
Qj ∈ F satisﬁes the condition (n-c).
The meaning of K(Q) is almost the same as that of Ni(Q) discussed in
the previous subsection: if a group S consists of individuals who are deprived
of any eﬀective power in γ0, there exists a member of S who expresses a non-
consequentialist evaluation between γ0 and any liberal game form γ.I nc o n -
trast, L(Q) is essentially gathering the ethical individuals together who have
non-consequentialist preferences in favor of the set of liberal game forms.
We are now ready to assert the following:
Theorem 4: Let Γ∗ = Γ. For any i ∈ N, there exists an ECF Ψ satisfying
SP, PI, I, and ND such that, for any Q ∈ ∆Ψ, Ψ(Q) ∈ QNCL and ∅ 6=
CΨ(Ψ(Q);R) ⊆ ΓNS ∩ ΓL ∩ ΓPE for every R ∈ Rn hold if and only if ∆Ψ ⊆
29(F,Q−i), ∩Q∈∆ΨK(Q)=2 N\{∅} and {i} ∈∩ Q∈∆ΨL(Q) hold.
This theorem says that the existence of a democratic ECF Ψ is guaranteed,
and that this Ψ generates a non-consequentialist social ordering function in
QNCL if and only if (1) any group of individuals objects to the deprivation
of its members0 liberal rights in terms of eﬀective power; and (2) there exists
an individual i ∈ N who not only always has ethical ordering functions in the
restricted domain (F,Q−i), but also always behaves as a non-consequentialist
in the sense that {i} ∈∩ Q∈∆ΨL(Q).
Capitalizing on Theorem 4, the next theorem is on the uniform ratio-
nalizability of eﬃcient and liberal game forms through the democratic social
decision procedure Ψ even within a broader domain than the self-interested
domain.
Theorem 5: Let Γ∗ = Γ. For any i ∈ N, there exists an ECF Ψ on ∆Ψ ⊆ Qn
satisfying SP, PI, I, and ND such that ∅ 6= ∩R∈RnCΨ(Ψ(Q);R) ⊆ ΓNS ∩
ΓL ∩ ΓPE for any Q ∈ ∆Ψ if ∆Ψ ⊆ (F,Q−i), ∩Q∈∆ΨK(Q)=2 N\{∅} and
{i} ∈∩ Q∈∆ΨL(Q) hold.
This theorem says that the necessary and suﬃcient condition in Theorem 4
also guarantees the solution for the issue of uniform rationalizability of eﬃcient
and liberal game forms.
It is worth emphasizing the two important roles of ethical individual i ∈
∩Q∈∆ΨL(Q)i nTheorem 4 and Theorem 5.T h eﬁrst role is that, by com-
mitting himself to the restricted class of ethical ordering functions, viz F, i can
guarantee a nice property of the choice set CΨ(Ψ(Q);R) for any Q ∈ ∆Ψ and
any R ∈ Rn to the eﬀect that CΨ(Ψ(Q);R) consists only of game forms repre-
senting the maximal freedom in the sense of van Hees (1999) as well as guaran-
30teeing the Nash-solvability and eﬃciency of the rationalized game forms. The
second role is that, by committing himself to behave as a non-consequentialist
in the sense that {i} ∈∩ Q∈∆ΨL(Q), i can ensure that Ψ not only always gener-
ates non-consequentialist liberal social ordering functions over its domain ∆Ψ,
but also the rational choice function CΨ chosen through Ψ meets the condition
of uniform rationalizability.
In contrast to the role of {i} ∈∩ Q∈∆ΨL(Q)a n dF, the role of any coalition
belonging to ∩Q∈∆ΨK(Q) is to guarantee liberalism of the rationalized game
forms.
5 Concluding Remarks
According to the tripartite classiﬁcation of the issues of libertarian rights due
to Pattanaik and Suzumura (1996; 1996) and Suzumura (1996; 2005), there
are three distinct issues to be identiﬁed and separately addressed to. The ﬁrst
issue of the formal structure of rights and the second issue of the realization
of conferred rights have received detailed logical scrutiny in the social-choice
theoretic approach due to Sen (1970, Chapter 6∗; 1970a; 1976; 1983,1992)
as well as in the game-form theoretic approach due to Sugden (1985), Deb
(1990/2004; 1994), Gaertner et al. (1992), Deb et al. (1997), Peleg (1998),
van Hees (1999), Peleg et al. (2002) and others, but the third issue of the
initial conferment of libertarian rights has received only scanty, if any at all,
analysis in the literature. This paper is devoted to this scarcely cultivated
issue within the extended analytical framework of game-form rights.
Our results are focused on the conditions under which the extended so-
cial choice rule satisfying essentially Arrovian axioms exists, which can choose
31game forms embodying libertarian values and generating Pareto eﬃcient cul-
mination outcomes at the Nash equilibria. Recollect that the original Arrovian
social choice framework is such that individuals express their respective sub-
jective values over the set of culmination outcomes, and the social choice rule
aggregates these individual values into the social value which, in its turn, is
invoked in the social choice of culmination outcomes. In contrast, our ex-
tended framework has two idiosyncratic features. In the ﬁrst place, the inputs
into the extended social choice rule are individual ordering functions, and the
outputs of the extended social choice rule are social ordering functions. Thus,
unlike the traditional approach where individual and social preferences are
consequentialist pure and simple, this extended framework can accommodate
individual0sa sw e l la ss o c i e t y 0s concern about the procedural aspects of social
choice. In the second place, unlike the traditional Arrovian ediﬁce, the object
of social choice is not the culmination outcome per se, but the game form, the
play of which in the realization stage results in the culmination outcome at the
Nash equilibrium of the game. The main purpose of this paper will be served
if this novel structure of social choice theory is found relevant in the concrete
context of social choice of game-form rights.
In concluding this paper, a general observation on the meaning of our
analysis may be in order. Recollect that it was North (1990, pp.3-4) who
crystallized the notion of institutions as rules of the game in a society. Note
also that Hurwicz (1996, p.115) reminded us of the fact that “it is the game
form, rather than the game, that corresponds to the intuitive notion of the
‘rules of the game’,” as “the players’ preferences are not part of the rules.”
Following the North-Hurwicz notion of institutions as the game forms, we may
suggest that our two-stage structure of the analysis of game-form rights can
32be construed as a possible framework for the social-choice theoretic analysis
of institutional choice and its decentralized realization. However, the fully-
ﬂedged development of this interesting scenario cannot but be relegated to the
future opportunity.
Appendix: Proofs
Given R ∈ Rn and Q ∈ ∆Ψ,l e tQN (R) ≡∩ h∈NQh (R), I (QN (R)) ≡
∩h∈NI (Qh (R)), and P (QN (R)) ≡ (∩h∈NQh (R))\I(QN(R)). Let a proﬁle
R0 ∈ Rn be such that every individual is universally indiﬀerent over A.G i v e n
γ =( M,g) ∈ Γ∗, for any h ∈ N,a n da n ymh ∈ Mh,l e tBh
mh ≡ g (mh,M −h).
Then, Eγ (h)=∪mh∈MhΩ(Bh
mh) for each and every h ∈ N, where and hereafter
Ω(B) denotes the family of sets consisting of B and all its supersets in A.
Γ∗ is assumed to be large enough in the following proofs, where the meaning
of “large enough” is that it contains actual game forms we construct in the
proofs. Let us say that a game form γ ∈ Γ∗ is power-dominated by another
game form γ0 ∈ Γ∗ if and only if Eγ0
(i) ⊇ Eγ (i) for all i ∈ N and Eγ0
(j) )
Eγ (j)f o rs o m ej ∈ N.A g a m e f o r m γ∗ ∈ Γ∗ represents a maximal power
structure if there is no other game form γ ∈ Γ∗ which power-dominates γ∗.
Let us denote by µ(Γ∗) the set of game forms, each member of which represents
a maximal power structure in Γ∗.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 1: Let a game form γ ∈ Γ∗ represent a maximal power structure.
Then, there exists a Nash-solvable and eﬃcient γ∗ ∈ Γ∗ such that Eγ∗ = Eγ.
Proof. Let γ ∈ µ(Γ∗). Then, by the deﬁnition of µ(Γ∗), Eγ satisﬁes maximal
33freedom in the sense of van Hees (1999). According to van Hees (1999, Theorem
1), there exists γ∗ ∈ Γ∗ which is Nash-solvable and eﬃcient, and satisﬁes
Eγ∗
= Eγ.
Lemma 2: Let a game form γ ∈ Γ∗ be such that γ / ∈ µ(Γ∗). Then, for any
R ∈ Rn and any (x,γ) ∈ Λ(R), there exists γ0 ∈ Γ∗ which power-dominates
γ and (x,γ0) ∈ Λ(R).
Proof. Since γ / ∈ µ(Γ∗) by assumption, there exists γ0 ∈ Γ∗ which power-
dominates γ. It follows from (x,γ) ∈ Λ(R) that there exists a Nash equilibrium
(mx
h)h∈N ∈ ²NE(γ,R)s u c ht h a tx = g((mx








∈ Πh∈NEγ (h) such that ∩h∈NBh
mx




(h)f o re v e r yh ∈ N.T h a t i s , f o r γ0 =( M0,g0) ∈ Γ∗ and for
each and every h ∈ N, there exists m0
h ∈ M0



















h = {x}.T a k ea n yj ∈ N,
























for every j ∈ N.T h i si m p l i e st h a t( x,γ0) ∈
Λ(R), since (x,γ) ∈ Λ(R).
Lemma 3: There exist at least three game forms γ0,γ00,γ000 ∈ µ(Γ∗) such that,
for any two γ,γ∗ ∈ {γ0,γ00,γ000}, for every h ∈ N, neither Eγ (h) ⊆ Eγ∗ (h)
nor Eγ (h) ⊇ Eγ∗
(h).
Proof. Since #A ≥ 3, there exist at least three alternatives x0,x00,x000 ∈ A.
Given any game form γ =( M,g) ∈ Γ∗,d e ﬁne γ0 =( M0,g 0) ∈ Γ∗ as follows:
for each h ∈ N, M0
h = Mh ∪ {x0}, and the outcome function g0 is such that,




g0 (m)=x0 if mh = x0 ∈ M0
h for some h ∈ N;
g0 (m)=g (m)o t h e r w i s e .
34Then, Eγ0 (h)=Ω({x0})f o re a c hh ∈ N.I ti se a s yt oc h e c kt h a tγ0 ∈ µ(Γ∗)
holds true. In a similar way, we can construct γ00,γ000 ∈ µ(Γ∗) such that
Eγ00
(h)=Ω({x00})a n dEγ000
(h)=Ω({x000})f o re a c hh ∈ N.N o t e t h a t , f o r
any two γ,γ∗ ∈ {γ0,γ00,γ000}, for every h ∈ N, {x∗} / ∈ Eγ (h), {x∗} ∈ Eγ∗ (h),
{x} / ∈ Eγ∗ (h), and {x} ∈ Eγ (h).
Lemma 4: Let a game form γ ∈ Γ∗ have the α-eﬀectivity function Eγ such
that Eγ(i)={A} for some i ∈ N. Then, for every R ∈ Rn and every
(x,γ) ∈ Λ(R), there exists γ0 ∈ Γ∗ such that Eγ0
(i) 6= {A} and (x,γ0) ∈ Λ(R).
Moreover, if {x} = τNE(γ,R),t h e n{x} = τNE(γ0,R).
Proof. By deﬁnition, Eγ (h)=∪mh∈MhΩ(Bh
mh)f o re a c hh ∈ N\{i},a n d





















∩ A = {x}.
Let us construct a new game form γ0 =( M0,g 0) ∈ Γ∗ as follows. For each
h ∈ N\{i}, M0
h ≡ Mh and M0
i = {A,{x}},a n d ,f o re a c hh ∈ N\{i} and each
mh ∈ M0






















= x if m0


















= x.I f {x} = τNE(γ,R), then by construction, {x} =
τNE(γ0,R) holds true. Moreover, Eγ0
(h)=∪mh∈M0
hΩ(Bh
mh ∪ {x})f o re a c h
h ∈ N\{i},a n dEγ0 (i)=Ω({x}).
Lemma 5: Let γ ∈ Γ∗ be an i-dictatorial game form. Then, for every R ∈
Rn and every (x,γ) ∈ Λ(R), there exists γ0 ∈ µ(Γ∗) such that Eγ0(j) 6= {A}
for some j ∈ N\{i} and (x,γ0) ∈ Λ(R).
35Proof. By a similar method used in the proof of Lemma 4, we can construct
ad e s i r e dg a m ef o r mγ0.
Lemma 6: Let γ0,γ00,γ000 ∈ µ(Γ∗) be the three game forms, the existence of
which being assured in Lemma 3. Assume that (x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R),(x00,γ00) ∈
Λ(R), and (x000,γ000) ∈ Λ(R) for some R ∈ Rn. Then, for every ECF Ψ satis-
fying SP, PI, and I, there exists a local dictator d ∈ N over {(x0,γ0),(x00,γ00),
(x000,γ000)}. Moreover, for every (e x,e γ) ∈ {(x0,γ0),(x00,γ00),(x000,γ000)} and every
(x∗,γ∗) ∈ Λ(R) with γ∗ ∈ µ(Γ∗)\[∪h∈NΓ(h)],
(i) if ((e x,e γ),(x∗,γ∗)) ∈ P(Qd(R)), then ((e x,e γ),(x∗,γ∗)) ∈ P(Q(R)),
(ii) if #N =2and ((x∗,γ∗),(e x,e γ)) ∈ P(Qd(R)), then ((x∗,γ∗),(e x,e γ)) ∈
P(Q(R)),
where Q = Ψ(Q).
Proof. Capitalizing on Lemma 3,w ec a nﬁnd three game forms γ0,γ00,γ000 ∈
µ(Γ∗) ∩ ΓL such that (x0,γ0),(x00,γ00),(x000,γ000) ∈ Λ(R). Moreover, for ev-
ery γ ∈ {γ0,γ00,γ000}, Eγ (h)=Ω({x})h o l d sf o re a c hh ∈ N,w h e r ex ∈
{x0,x00,x000}. Then, we can see that the free triple property holds among
(x0,γ0),(x00,γ00)(x000,γ000) on the domain Sn, so that there exists a (local) dic-
tator, say d, for the social evaluation among these three extended alternatives
by virtue of the Arrovian impossibility theorem.
Suppose that there exists γ∗ ∈ µ(Γ∗)\{γ0,γ00,γ000} satisfying (x∗,γ∗) ∈
Λ(R). If x∗ / ∈ {x0,x00,x000} and any other Nash equilibrium outcome of the
game (γ∗,R)d o e sn o tb e l o n gt o{x0,x00,x000}, then it is easy to show that d
can extend his dictatorship to include (x∗,γ∗), because of the free triple prop-
erty. Suppose that x∗ ∈ {x0,x00,x000} or there exists another x∗0 ∈ τNE(γ∗,R)
such that x∗0 ∈ {x0,x00,x000}.L e tx00 = x∗ or x00 = x∗0.
36P r o o fo ft h eS t a t e m e n t( i ) .
Suppose that ((x∗,γ∗),(x0,γ0)) ∈ Q(R) in spite of ((x0,γ0),(x∗,γ∗)) ∈
P (Qd (R)). Then, we can ﬁnd a new game form γ∗∗ ∈ Γ∗ such that, for
each h ∈ N, Eγ∗∗(h) * Eγ∗(h)a n dEγ000(h) * Eγ∗∗(h). Choose π : A → A
appropriately, and let γ∗∗ =( M∗∗,g∗∗) ∈ Γ∗ be such that, for each h ∈ N,
M∗∗
h ≡ M∗
h,a n dg∗∗ (m) ≡ π (g∗ (m)) for every m ∈ M∗∗. Then, for any h ∈ N,
Eγ∗∗(h) * Eγ∗(h) holds. Note that, if Eγ∗(h) ) Eγ000(h)f o rs o m eh ∈ N,i t
follows that Eγ∗(h) ) Ω({x000}). In this case, for any h0 ∈ N\{h}, Eγ∗(h0) +
Ω({e x})f o ra n ye x ∈ A. Then, since γ∗ / ∈∪ h∈NΓ(h), there exists b x ∈ A such
that Eγ∗
(h) + Ω({b x}). Thus, by choosing π : A → A so that π(b x)=x000,
π(x000)=b x,a n dπ(e x)=e x for all e x ∈ A\{x000,b x},w eh a v eEγ000(h) * Eγ∗∗(h)
for each h ∈ N.I fEγ∗(h) + Eγ000(h) for any h ∈ N,t h e nc h o o s eπ : A → A as
the identity mapping. Thus, we have Eγ000(h) * Eγ∗∗(h)f o re a c hh ∈ N.S i n c e
γ∗ ∈ µ(Γ∗), it follows that γ∗∗ ∈ µ(Γ∗), so that there exists x∗∗ ∈ τNE(γ∗∗,R)
by Lemma 1.
Consider a proﬁle e Q ∈ Sn such that ((x000,γ000),(x∗∗,γ∗∗)) ∈ e QN (R),
((x∗∗,γ∗∗),(x∗,γ∗)) ∈ e QN (R), and e Qh (R) ∩ {(x∗,γ∗),(x0,γ0)}
2 = Qh (R) ∩
{(x∗,γ∗),(x0,γ0)}





Then, by SP and PI, and the transitivity of e Q(R), ((x000,γ000),(x∗,γ∗)) ∈
e Q(R). Also, by I,( ( x∗,γ∗),(x0,γ0)) ∈ e Q(R). But this contradicts the consis-





. Thus, even if x∗ ∈ {x0,x00,x000} or there exists another
x∗0 ∈ τNE(γ∗,R)s u c ht h a tx∗0 ∈ {x0,x00,x000},( ( x0,γ0),(x∗,γ∗)) ∈ P (Qd (R))
cannot but imply ((x0,γ0),(x∗,γ∗)) ∈ P (Q(R)).
P r o o fo ft h eS t a t e m e n t( i i ) .
Suppose that #N =2 ,γ∗ / ∈∪ h∈NΓ(h), and ((x0,γ0),(x∗,γ∗)) ∈ Q(R)
37hold in spite of ((x∗,γ∗),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P (Qd (R)). Note that, since #N =2
and γ∗ / ∈∪ h∈NΓ(h), γ∗ ∈ µ(Γ∗) ∩ ΓL holds. Then, we can ﬁnd a new game
form γ∗∗ ∈ µ(Γ∗) ∩ ΓL such that, for each h ∈ N, Eγ∗∗
(h) + Eγ∗
(h)a n d
Eγ000(h) + Eγ∗∗(h). To verify this fact, choose π : A → A appropriately, and
deﬁne γ∗∗ =( M∗∗,g∗∗) ∈ Γ∗ as follows: for each h ∈ N, M∗∗
h ≡ M∗
h,a n d
g∗∗ (m) ≡ π (g∗ (m)) for each m ∈ M∗∗. Then, for any h ∈ N, Eγ∗∗(h) +
Eγ∗(h) holds. Note that, if Eγ∗(h) ( Eγ000(h)f o rs o m eh ∈ N, it follows that
Eγ∗(h) ( Ω({x000}). In this case, for any B ⊆ A\{x000}, B/ ∈ Eγ∗(h). Since
γ∗ ∈ µ(Γ∗), it is a semi-tight game form in the sense of van Hees (1999, Lemma
0.2), which implies Eγ∗
(N\{h}) ⊇ Ω({x000}). Thus, for another individual
h0 ∈ N\{h}, Eγ∗(h0) ⊇ Ω({x000})h o l d sb y# N = 2. Then, by choosing
π : A → A as π(x000)=b x, π(b x)=x000,a n dπ(e x)=e x for all e x ∈ A\{x000,b x},
where Ω(b x) * Eγ∗(h0), we have Eγ000(h) + Eγ∗∗(h)f o re a c hh ∈ N.N o t et h a t
such b x exists, since γ∗ ∈ µ(Γ∗) ∩ ΓL.I f Eγ∗(h) * Eγ000(h) for any h ∈ N,
then we may choose π : A → A as the identity mapping. Thus, we have
Eγ000(h) + Eγ∗∗(h)f o re v e r yh ∈ N.
Consider e Q ∈ Sn such that ((x∗∗,γ∗∗),(x000,γ000)) ∈ e QN (R), ((x∗,γ∗),(x∗∗,
γ∗∗)) ∈ e QN (R), and e Qh (R)∩{(x∗,γ∗),(x0,γ0)}
2 = Qh (R)∩{(x∗,γ∗),(x0,γ0)}
2




. Then, by SP and
PI, and the transitivity of e Q(R), ((x∗,γ∗),(x000,γ000)) ∈ e Q(R)h o l d s . A l s o ,
by I,( ( x0,γ0),(x∗,γ∗)) ∈ e Q(R) holds. Then, e Q(R) turns out to be in-




,i nc o n t r a d i c t i o nw i t ht h e
transitivity thereof. Thus, even if x∗ ∈ {x0,x00,x000} or there exists another
x∗0 ∈ τNE(γ∗,R)s u c ht h a tx∗0 ∈ {x0,x00,x000},( ( x∗,γ∗),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P (Qd (R))
cannot but imply ((x∗,γ∗),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P (Q(R)).
Lemma 7: Let R ∈ Rn be such that there exists an individual j ∈ N who has
38the unique maximal element xj in A in terms of Rj. Moreover, his maximal
element xj ∈ A at Rj is uniquely worst for any other individual h 6= j at Rh.
Then, for every game form γ =( M,g)w i t hτNE(γ,R) 6= ∅, τNE(γ,R) ( A.
In particular, either τNE(γ,R)={xj} or xj / ∈ τNE(γ,R).
Proof. Suppose τNE(γ,R)=A,s ot h a txj ∈ τNE(γ,R). By deﬁnition, there
exists mxj ∈ ²NE(γ,R) such that g(mxj)=xj.T h e n , f o r e v e r y h 6= j,a n d






















Thus, Eγ(j) ⊇ Ω({xj}).
Since xj i st h eu n i q u em a x i m a le l e m e n tf o rj at Rj, Eγ(j) ⊇ Ω({xj})
implies that any other x ∈ A\{xj} cannnot be a Nash equilibrium outcome of
the game (γ,R), which is a contradiction. Thus, τNE(γ,R) ( A. In particular,
if xj ∈ τNE(γ,R), then τNE(γ,R)={xj}.
Proof of Theorem 1: Let Ψ be an ECF satisfying SP, PI,a n dI.
Case 1: #N ≥ 3.
Take any proﬁle R ∈ Rn such that each individual h ∈ N has the unique
maximal element xh in A in terms of Rh.M o r e o v e r , f o r t h i s R ∈ Rn,t h e r e
exists j ∈ N such that his maximal element xj ∈ A at Rj is uniquely worst
for any other individual h 6= j at Rh. Then, for every h-dictatorial game form





First, for any (x,γ) ∈ Λ(R), if γ / ∈ µ(Γ∗), then γ / ∈ CΨ(Ψ(Q);R) for every
Q ∈ Sn. This is because there exists γ0 ∈ µ(Γ∗)s u c ht h a t( x,γ0) ∈ Λ(R),
and γ0 power-dominates γ by Lemma 2. Moreover, by the restriction (b) of
Sn, SP implies the above mentioned result. Thus, CΨ(Ψ(Q);R) ⊆ µ(Γ∗)f o r
every Q ∈ Sn.
39Second, note that ∪h∈NΓ(h) ( µ(Γ∗). Let us consider the social evaluation
Q(R)=Ψ(Q(R)) over the set of all dictatorial game forms, viz., ∪h∈NΓ(h).
By the restriction (b) of Sn, we can regard each Γ(h) to be an essentially single-
ton set in the evaluation by Q(R). Take
©¡
xh,γh¢ª
h∈N ⊆ Λ(R). Since n ≥ 3
and #A ≥ 3, it follows from the condition of R that there are at least three







∈ Λ(R). As mentioned above, xj is the
unique element of τNE(γj,R). Likewise, xk (resp.xl) is the unique element
of τNE(γk,R) (resp. τNE(γl,R)). Then, we can see that the free triple prop-






even in the restricted domain Sn.
Thus, by the Arrovian impossibility theorem [Arrow (1963)], there exists a (lo-







Suppose there exists t ∈ N\{j,k,l} such that (xt,γt) ∈ Λ(R). If xt / ∈
©
xj,xk,xlª
, then it is easy to show that i can extend his dictatorship to include
(xt,γt). Suppose xt ∈
©
xj,xk,xlª
,a n d( ( xt,γt),(xj,γj)) ∈ Q(R)e v e ni f










∈ e QN (R)a n de Qh (R) ∩ {(xj,γj),(xt,γt)}
2 =
Qh (R) ∩ {(xj,γj),(xt,γt)}
2 for all h ∈ N.M o r e o v e r , ( ( xj,γj),(xk,γk)) ∈





∈ e Q(R). Also, by I,
((xt,γt),(xj,γj)) ∈ e Q(R). Then, e Q(R) is not consistent since ((xj,γj),(xk,
γk)) ∈ P(e Q(R)). This implies that i can extend his dictatorship to include
(xt,γt)e v e nw h e nxt ∈
©
xj,xk,xlª





Third, consider the social evaluation Q(R)=Ψ(Q(R)) over the set
µ(Γ∗)\[∪h∈NΓ(h)]. Capitalizing on Lemma 3,w ec a nﬁnd three game forms
40γ0,γ00,γ000 ∈ µ(Γ∗) ∩ ΓL such that (x0,γ0),(x00,γ00),(x000,γ000) ∈ Λ(R), and
for every γ ∈ {γ0,γ00,γ000}, Eγ (h)=Ω({x})h o l d sf o re a c hh ∈ N,w h e r e
x ∈ {x0,x00,x000}.S i n c e # N ≥ 3, we can assume {x0,x00,x000} = {xj,xk,xl}.
Thus, by the property of each γ ∈ {γ0,γ00,γ000} and the assumption on R,e a c h
x ∈ {x0,x00,x000} is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome of the game (γ,R),
where γ ∈ {γ0,γ00,γ000}. Then, by Lemma 6, there exists a (local) dictator,
say d,f o rt h es o c i a le v a l u a t i o na m o n g( x0,γ0), (x00,γ00)a n d( x000,γ000).
Suppose that there exists γ∗ ∈ µ(Γ∗)\([∪h∈NΓ(h)]∪{γ0,γ00,γ000}) satisfying
(x∗,γ∗) ∈ Λ(R). If x∗ / ∈ {x0,x00,x000} and any other Nash equilibrium outcome
o ft h eg a m e( γ∗,R)d o e sn o tb e l o n gt o{x0,x00,x000},t h e ni ti se a s yt os h o w
that d can extend his dictatorship to include (x∗,γ∗), because of the free triple
property. Suppose, therefore, that x∗ ∈ {x0,x00,x000} or there exists another
x∗0 ∈ τNE(γ∗,R) such that x∗0 ∈ {x0,x00,x000}.
Suppose ((x0,γ0),(x∗,γ∗)) ∈ P(Qd(R)). Then, by Lemma 6,( ( x0,γ0),(x∗,
γ∗)) ∈ P(Q(R)) holds. Suppose that ((x0,γ0),(x∗,γ∗)) ∈ Q(R)i ns p i t eo f
((x∗,γ∗),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P(Qd(R)). Then, we can ﬁnd in the following a new
game form γ∗∗ ∈ µ(Γ∗)s u c ht h a t ,f o re a c hh ∈ N, Eγ000
(h) + Eγ∗∗
(h). By
Lemma 7,e i t h e rxj / ∈ τNE(γ∗,R)o r{xj} = τNE(γ∗,R). If xj / ∈ τNE(γ∗,R),
then choose γ∗∗ ∈ µ(Γ∗)s ot h a tEγ∗∗(h)=Ω({x∗∗})h o l d sf o re a c hh ∈ N,
where x∗∗ = xj.I f {xj} = τNE(γ∗,R), then choose γ∗∗ ∈ µ(Γ∗)s ot h a t
Eγ∗∗(h)=Ω({x∗∗})f o re v e r yh ∈ N,w h e r ex∗∗ ∈ {x0,x00,x000}\{xj,x0}.T h u s ,
we have Eγ000(h) + Eγ∗∗(h) for every h ∈ N. Furthermore, (x∗∗,γ∗) / ∈ Λ(R)
and (x∗,γ∗∗) / ∈ Λ(R). The latter holds true, since {x∗∗} = τNE(γ∗∗,R)b yt h e
deﬁnition of γ∗∗ and R.
Consider e Q ∈ Sn such that ((x∗∗,γ∗∗),(x000,γ000)) ∈ e QN(R), ((x∗,γ∗),(x∗∗,
γ∗∗)) ∈ e QN (R), and e Qh (R)∩{(x∗,γ∗),(x0,γ0)}
2 = Qh (R)∩{(x∗,γ∗),(x0,γ0)}
2





SP and PI, and by the transitivity of e Q(R), ((x∗,γ∗),(x000,γ000)) ∈ e Q(R).
Also, by I,( ( x0,γ0),(x∗,γ∗)) ∈ e Q(R). Then, e Q(R) turns out to be incon-




, which contradicts the
transitivity thereof. Thus, even if x∗ ∈ {x0,x00,x000} or there exists another
x∗0 ∈ τNE(γ∗,R)s u c ht h a tx∗0 ∈ {x0,x00,x000},( ( x∗,γ∗),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P (Qd (R))
cannnot but imply ((x∗,γ∗),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P (Q(R)). Thus, d can extend his
dictatorship to include (x∗,γ∗).
Thus far, d is a local dictator over µ(Γ∗)\[∪h∈NΓ(h)], whereas i is a local
dictator over ∪h∈NΓ(h). We will show now that d = i.S u p p o s ed 6= i. Capital-




we can ﬁnd two game forms γj
∗,γk
∗ ∈ µ(Γ∗)\[∪h∈NΓ(h)] such that xh is the
unique Nash equilibrium outcome of the game (γh

































∈ QN (R). By virtue of the free triple



























Q(R)b ySP and PI.T h u s ,Q(R) cannot be consistent, a contradiction. Thus,
d = i,s ot h a td can extend his dictatorship over µ(Γ∗). Hence CΨ(Q;R)=
CΨ(Qd;R) for every Q ∈ Sn,w h e r eQ = Ψ(Q).
By virtue of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, for every Q ∈ Sn, CΨ(Ψ(Q);R)∩
Γ(h)=∅ for every h 6= d.I n f a c t , i f
¡
xh,γh¢
∈ Λ(R), where γh ∈ Γ(h),







∈ Λ(R)a n dEγh


















42for every Q ∈ Sn. We can also verify that, for every γ∗ ∈ µ(Γ∗) such that
Eγ∗
(d)={A}, γ∗ / ∈ CΨ(Ψ(Q);R)h o l d sf o re v e r yQ ∈ Sn.
Finally, we must show that if Ψ satisﬁes URC,t h e nΓ(d) ⊆∩ e R∈RnCΨ(Ψ(Q);
e R) for every Q ∈ Sn. Note that, for some Q0 ∈ Sn,w eh a v eCΨ(Ψ(Q0);R)=
Γ(d). It follows from URC that ∩e R∈RnCΨ(Ψ(Q0);˜ R)=Γ(d). Let us take
any other proﬁle R0 ∈ Rn such that every individual h has the unique max-
imal element x0h in A with respect to R0
h. Similarly, there exists a local
R0-dictator d0 ∈ N over µ(Γ∗) such that CΨ(Ψ(Q00);R
0)=Γ(d0)f o rs o m e
Q00 ∈ Sn. Then, by URC, ∩e R∈RnCΨ(Ψ(Q00);˜ R)=Γ(d0). In particular,
we have CΨ(Ψ(Q00);R) ⊇ Γ(d0). Since CΨ(Ψ(Q);R) ∩ Γ(h)=∅ for every
Q ∈ Sn,a n de v e r yh 6= d, it follows that d0 = d.
Recollect that the proﬁle R0 ∈ Rn is such that every alternative in A
becomes a Nash equilibrium outcome in every game form with this prefer-
ence proﬁle. By URC, CΨ(Ψ(Q0);R
0) ∩ Γ(d) 6= ∅, which implies Γ(d) ⊆
CΨ(Ψ(Q0);R
0). Note that, for every
¡
x,γd¢










every Q ∈ Sn. Thus, by I, CΨ(Ψ(Q);R0) ∩ Γ(d)=CΨ(Ψ(Q0);R0)∩Γ(d)f o r
every Q ∈ Sn. Thus, by URC, Γ(d) ⊆∩ ˜ R∈RnCΨ(Ψ(Q); ˜ R) for every Q ∈ Sn.
Moreover, we obtain ∩Q∈Sn ∩e R∈Rn CΨ(Ψ(Q), e R)=Γ(d) by the existence of
Q0.
Case 2: #N =2 .
Take any proﬁle R ∈ Rn such that (x1,x3),(x3,x2) ∈ P (R1)a n d( x2,x3),
(x3,x1) ∈ P (R2). Then, for every h ∈ N = {1,2},a n de v e r yh-dictatorial





.L e t γ3 ∈ µ(Γ∗)\[∪h∈NΓ(h)] be such that Eγ3 (h)=Ω({x3})
for each h ∈ N. Note that for γ3, τNE(γ3,R)={x3}, since for any strat-
43egy proﬁle which attains x1, the individual 2 has another strategy to change
the social outcome from x1 to x3. The same is true for x2.T h u s , t h e
triple (x1,γ1),(x2,γ2),(x3,γ3) ∈ Λ(R) has a free triple property even within
∆Ψ = Sn. This implies that, by the Arrovian impossibility theorem [Arrow
(1963)], there exists a (local) dictator, say i, for the social evaluation among
(x1,γ1),(x2,γ2),(x3,γ3).
Next, capitalizing on Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 and noting that (x1,γ1),(x2,
γ2) ∈ Λ(R), we can ﬁnd two game forms γ1
∗,γ2
∗ ∈ µ(Γ∗)\[∪h∈NΓ(h)] such
that each xh is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome of the game (γh
∗,R)
for each h ∈ N. In particular, Eγ1
∗(h)=Ω({x1})a n dEγ2
∗(h)=Ω({x2})
hold for each h ∈ N. Then, since (x1,γ1
∗),(x2,γ2
∗),(x3,γ3)c o n s t i t u t eaf r e e
triple, there exists a (local) dictator, say d, for the social evaluation among
(x1,γ1
∗),(x2,γ2
∗),(x3,γ3). Since the two free triples overlap at (x3,γ3), we are
assured that d = i.
Suppose that there exists γ∗ ∈ µ(Γ∗)\[(∪h∈NΓ(h)) ∪ {γ1
∗,γ2
∗,γ3}]s a t i s f y -
ing (x∗,γ∗) ∈ Λ(R). Then, by Lemma 6, d c a ne x t e n dh i sd i c t a t o r s h i pt o
include (x∗,γ∗). The remaining argument can be developed in the same way
as in the case where #N ≥ 3.
A.2 Proofs of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3
Lemma 8: Given i ∈ N and Q ∈ Sn,l e t{j} ∈ Ni(Q). Then, for ev-
ery (γ,γ0) ∈ Γp(i) × Γu(i) with Eγ0(j)={A}, every R ∈ Rn, and every
(x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R),((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P (Qj(R)) holds true.
Proof. Let a proﬁle R0 ∈ Rn be such that every individual is universally
indiﬀerent over A. Then, for every (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ A × Γ∗,( x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈
Λ(R0). Moreover, if γ ∈ Γp(i)a n dγ0 ∈ Γu(i)w i t hEγ0(j)={A},t h e n
44((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P (Qj(R0)). This follows from ((x,γ),(x,γ0)),((x0,γ),(x0,γ0))
∈ P (Qj(R0)) and ((x,γ0),(x0,γ0)) ∈ I (Qj(R0)) by the property of Sn and
the transitivity of Qj(R0). Thus, by the condition (n-c),f o re v e r yR ∈ Rn,i f
(x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), then ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P(Qj(R)).
Proof of Theorem 2: If ∆Ψ = Sn, there exists an individual i ∈ N who
is decisive over the whole set of extended alternatives. Let ∩Q∈∆ΨNi(Q) ⊇
2N\{i}\{∅}.F o r e v e r y R ∈ Rn,e v e r yQ ∈ ∆Ψ, and every (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈
Λ(R), deﬁne Ψ as follows:
(i) if γ,γ0 ∈ Γp (i), then ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P (Q(R)) ⇔ ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈
P (Qi(R)) ∪ P (QN(R)), and ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ I (Q(R)) ⇔ ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈
I (Qi(R))\P (QN(R));
(ii) if γ ∈ Γp (i)a n dγ0 ∈ Γu (i), ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P (Q(R)); and
(iii) if γ,γ0 ∈ Γu(i), then ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P (Q(R)) ⇔ ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈
P (Qj(R)) ∪ P (QN(R)), and ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ I (Q(R)) ⇔ ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈
I (Qj(R))\P (QN(R)) for some {j} ∈∩ Q∈∆ΨNi(Q), where Q = Ψ(Q).
Note that (i), (ii) and (iii) are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaus-
tive. The above Q(R) is complete, and has a two-tier structure. It is also
an ordering. We must examine whether or not the part (ii) is consistent
with the Arrovian four conditions and the domain restrictions. For every
(x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), if γ ∈ Γp(i)a n dγ0 ∈ Γu (i), then by the condition
∩Q∈∆ΨNi(Q) ⊇ 2N\{i}\{∅} and Lemma 8, there exists at least one indi-
vidual j ∈ N\{i} such that Eγ0(j)={A} and ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P (Qj(R)).
Thus, the part (ii) is consistent with SP and PI.
By construction, it is easy to verify that Ψ satisﬁes SP, PI, I,a n dND.
Moreover, ∪Q∈∆Ψ ∪R∈Rn CΨ(Q;R) ⊆ Γp (i). Note that Γp (i) contains a game
45form γ with Eγ(i)={A}. However, such a game form cannot be rationally
chosen, since, for every R ∈ Rn,i f( x,γ) ∈ Λ(R), then there exists another
game form γ0 ∈ Γp (i)w i t hEγ0
(i) 6= {A} such that (x,γ0) ∈ Λ(R). This is
guaranteed by Lemma 4. Thus, by the restriction (b) of Sn,( ( x,γ0),(x,γ)) ∈
P (Qi(R)), which implies ((x,γ0),(x,γ)) ∈ P (Q(R)). In summary, we have:
γ ∈∪ Q∈∆Ψ ∪R∈Rn CΨ(Ψ(Q);R) ⇒∀ j ∈ N, ∃B
j ∈ E
γ(j)s . t .B
j 6= A.
Thus, ∪Q∈∆Ψ ∪R∈Rn CΨ(Ψ(Q);R) ⊆ ΓL.N o t et h a te v e r yγ ∈∪ Q∈∆Ψ ∪R∈Rn
CΨ(Ψ(Q);R) also represents a maximal power-structure. In fact, Lemma 2,
the restriction (b) of Sn and SP together guarantee that, for every γ / ∈ µ(Γ∗),
γ / ∈∪ Q∈∆Ψ ∪R∈Rn CΨ(Ψ(Q);R)h o l d s . T h u s ,∪Q∈∆Ψ ∪R∈Rn CΨ(Ψ(Q);R) ⊆
µ(Γ∗). By Lemma 1, there exists a liberal game form in CΨ(Ψ(Q);R)f o r
any Q ∈ ∆Ψ and any R ∈ Rn, which is Nash-solvable and eﬃcient.
Proof of Theorem 3: If ∆Ψ = Sn, there exists an individual i ∈ N who is
decisive over the whole set of extended alternatives.
Let ∩Q∈∆ΨNi(Q) ⊇ 2N\{i}\{∅} and {i} ∈∩ Q∈∆ΨMi(Q). For every R ∈
Rn,e v e r yQ ∈ ∆Ψ, and every (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), deﬁne Ψ as in the proof of
Theorem 2. Then, our only task is to examine the uniform rationalizability by
means of Q = Ψ(Q). By construction, if γ,γ0 / ∈ Γu (i), then ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈
Q(R) ⇔ ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ Qi(R). Also, CΨ(Q;R) ⊆ µ(Γ∗)\[∪h∈NΓu (h)].
Take R0 ∈ Rn in which every individual is universally indiﬀerent over A.T h e n ,
CΨ(Q;R0)i si d e n t i ﬁed. By the domain restriction (b) of Sn, CΨ(Q;R0)=
CΨ(Qi;R0) ⊆ µ(Γ∗). Thus, it consists of Nash-solvable and eﬃcient game
forms. Since {i} ∈∩ Q∈∆ΨMi(Q)f o ra l lR ∈ Rn, CΨ(Qi;R) remains invariant,
which implies that ∩R∈RnCΨ(Q;R) 6= ∅. By the construction of Ψ,a n y
dictatorial game form cannot be rationally chosen.
46A.3 Proofs of Theorem 4 and Theorem 5
Proof of Theorem 4:
P r o o fo fS u ﬃciency:F o r e v e r y R ∈ Rn,e v e r yQ ∈ ∆Ψ, and every
(x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), deﬁne Ψ as follows:
(I) if γ,γ0 ∈ ΓL,t h e n( ( x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P (Q(R)) ⇔ ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈
P (Qi(R)) ∪ P (QN(R)), and ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ I (Q(R)) ⇔ ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈
I (Qi(R))\P (QN(R));
(II) if γ ∈ ΓL and γ0 / ∈ ΓL,( ( x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P (Q(R));
(III) otherwise, ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P (Q(R)) ⇔ ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P (Qj(R)) ∪
P (QN(R)), and ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ I (Q(R)) ⇔ ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ I (Qj(R))\P
(QN(R)) for some j 6= i,
where Q = Ψ(Q).
This Q(R) is an ordering. Also, since {i} ∈∩ Q∈∆ΨL(Q), Q ∈ QNCL
holds. We must examine whether or not the part (II) is consistent with the
Arrovian four conditions and the domain restrictions. For every R ∈ Rn and
every (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), if γ ∈ ΓL and γ0 / ∈ ΓL, then by the condition
∩Q∈∆ΨK(Q)=2 N\{∅}, there exists at least one individual j ∈ N such that
Qj ∈ S;f o rs o m eS ⊆ N with j ∈ S, Eγ0(S)={A};a n d( ( x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈
P (Qj(R)). The last equation can be obtained by the (n-c) condition of Qj
and Lemma 8.T h u s ,t h ep a r t( I I )i sc o n s i s t e n tw i t hSP and PI.
Let Γ∗
L ≡ ΓL ∩ µ(Γ∗). By construction, it is easy to see that Ψ satisﬁes
SP, PI, I,a n dND. Moreover, from the property (I) of Ψ, {i} ∈∩ Q∈∆ΨL(Q),
and by virtue of the restrictions (a) and (b) of F,w eh a v e∪Q∈∆Ψ ∪R∈Rn
CΨ(Ψ(Q);R) ⊆ Γ∗
L, which implies that there exists γ ∈ CΨ(Ψ(Q);R)f o ra n y
Q ∈ ∆Ψ and any R ∈ Rn, which is a Nash-solvable, eﬃcient, and liberal game
form by Lemma 1. The non-emptiness of CΨ(Ψ(Q);R)i sg u a r a n t e e db yt h e
47restriction (a) of F and the condition (n-c) on Q = Ψ(Q). This is because,
by these conditions, Q evaluates the wellness of alternative liberal game forms
on the basis of the structures of their corresponding α-eﬀectivity functions, the
class of which being ﬁnite by virtue of the ﬁniteness of A.
P r o o fo fN e c e s s i t y : First, we show the necessity of ∩Q∈∆ΨK(Q)=2 N\{∅}.
Suppose that there exists Q ∈ ∆Ψ such that, for some S ⊆ N,f o rs o m e
(γ,γ0) ∈ ΓL × (Γ∗\ΓL)w i t hEγ0(S)={A},f o rs o m eR ∈ Rn,a n df o rs o m e
(x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), ((x0,γ0),(x,γ)) ∈ Qj(R)h o l d sf o re v e r yj ∈ S with
Qj ∈ T .T h e n i t f o l l o w s t h a t x 6= x0 by the fact that Qj ∈ T satisﬁes the
restriction (b) of S.
Given the above two game forms γ and γ0,w ec a nc o n s i d e rt h ef o l l o w i n g
two cases. The ﬁrst case is that there exists at least one individual j∗ ∈ S such
that, for some B ∈ Eγ(j∗), either B ( A\{x} or x ∈ B ( A holds; the second
case is that, for every j ∈ S,i fB ∈ Eγ(j∗) implies B ( A,t h e nB = A\{x}.
For each of these two cases, we can construct (γ∗,γ∗0) ∈ ΓL × (Γ∗\ΓL)w i t h
Eγ∗
(j∗) + Eγ(j∗)a n dEγ∗0
(j∗)={A} for some j∗ ∈ S.
Consider the ﬁrst case. Then, γ∗ =( M∗,g ∗) ∈ ΓL is deﬁned as follows: let
M∗
j∗ = Mj∗ for j∗; M∗






g (m)i f m ∈ M;
x otherwise.











g0 (m)i f m ∈ M0;
x otherwise.
Then, (x,γ∗),(x0,γ∗0) ∈ Λ(R). Moreover, Eγ∗
(j∗) ⊆ Eγ(j∗)a n dEγ∗0
(j∗)=
{A}.
48Next, consider the second case. Let mx ∈ ²NE(γ,R)b es u c ht h a tg (mx)=





= A.T a k e s o m e j∗ ∈ S
freely, and let e B ≡ A\{x00} for some x00 ∈ A\{x,x0}.D e ﬁne γ∗ =( M∗,g∗) ∈
ΓL as follows. Let M∗





h = Mh ∪ {x} for any h 6= j∗;




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
g (m)i f m ∈ M
x( e B,m−j∗) if mj∗ = e B and m−j∗ ∈ M−j∗
x otherwise,



















= ∅.T h e n ,e m =
³
e B, e m−j∗
´
∈
M∗ with e mh = x for any h 6= j∗ constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the game
(γ∗,R)w i t hg∗ (e m)=x.M o r e o v e r , Eγ∗(j∗)=Ω(A\{x00}), which implies
Eγ∗(j∗) + Eγ(j∗)a n dEγ∗(j∗) * Eγ(j∗).
Thus, in both of the above two cases, since Eγ∗0(j∗)={A}, the restriction
(b) of T implies that ((x0,γ0),(x0,γ∗0)) ∈ I (Qj∗(R)) for j∗ ∈ S.M o r e o v e r ,
γ,γ∗ ∈ ΓL implies that there exists Q0
j∗ ∈ T such that ((x,γ),(x,γ∗)) ∈
Q0





,w ec o n c l u d et h a t( ( x0,γ∗0),(x,
γ∗)) ∈ Q0
j∗(R)f o r( γ∗,γ∗0) ∈ ΓL × (Γ∗\ΓL). Note that Eγ∗
(h)=Ω({x})a n d
Eγ∗0(h)=Ω({x0})f o re v e r yh 6= j∗.T h u s , Eγ∗(h) + Eγ∗0(h)a n dEγ∗(h) *
Eγ∗0(h) for every h 6= j∗. This implies that, for every h 6= j∗, there exists Q0
h ∈
T such that ((x0,γ∗0),(x,γ∗)) ∈ Q0
h(R). Thus, we can show that there exists a
proﬁle Q0 ∈ ∆Ψ such that, for any Ψ satisfying the Arrovian four conditions,
((x0,γ∗0),(x,γ∗)) ∈ Q
0(R), where Q0 = Ψ(Q0). This implies Q0 / ∈ QL.
In this case, we can show that if ((x0,γ∗0),(x,γ∗)) ∈ Q0(R) (resp. P (Q0(R))),
then ((x0,γ∗0),(x,γ∗)) ∈ Q0
i(R) (resp. P (Q0
i(R))). Suppose ((x0,γ∗0),(x,γ∗)) ∈
Q0(R), but ((x,γ∗),(x0,γ∗0)) ∈ P (Q0
i(R)). Let us take a game form γ00 ∈ Γ∗
L
49such that, for every h ∈ N, Eγ00(h)=Ω({x00}). By Lemma 3,w ec a nﬁnd
such a game form. Since γ∗,γ00 ∈ ΓL, we can assume that ((x00,γ00),(x,γ∗)) ∈
I (Q0
h(R)) for every h ∈ N.T h u s , ( ( x00,γ00),(x,γ∗)) ∈ I (Q0(R)) by PI.L e t
us also take a game form b γ
∗0 ∈ Γ∗
L such that, for every h ∈ N, Eb γ∗0
(h)=













i(R)). Note that, by Lemma 6, this individual i can











Then, Q0(R) turns out to be inconsistent. Thus, ((x0,γ∗0),(x,γ∗)) ∈ Q0(R)
implies ((x0,γ∗0),(x,γ∗)) ∈ Q0
i(R). The case of strict part can be treated in a
similar way.
N e x t ,w ec a ns h o wt h a t ,f o re v e r y( e x,e γ) ∈ Λ(R)w i t he γ ∈ Γ∗
L,( ( x0,γ∗0),(e x,e γ))
∈ P (Q0
i(R)) implies ((x0,γ∗0),(e x,e γ)) ∈ P (Q0(R)). Suppose ((e x,e γ),(x0,γ∗0)) ∈
Q0(R)i ns p i t eo f( ( x0,γ∗0),(e x,e γ)) ∈ P (Q0
i(R)). Let ((x00,γ00),(e x,e γ)) ∈ P (Q0
i(R))
and ((x00,γ00),(x,γ∗)) ∈ I(Q0
h(R)) for every h ∈ N. Then, by Lemma 6,
((x00,γ00),(e x,e γ)) ∈ P (Q0(R)), and ((x00,γ00),(x,γ∗)) ∈ I (Q0(R)) by PI.T h u s ,
whenever ((x0,γ∗0),(x,γ∗)) ∈ Q0(R), Q0(R) turns out to be inconsistent. Thus,
for any (e x,e γ) ∈ Λ(R)w i t he γ ∈ Γ∗
L,( ( x0,γ∗0),(e x,e γ)) ∈ P (Q0
i(R)) implies
((x0,γ∗0),(e x,e γ)) ∈ P (Q0(R)).
Let (e x0,e γ
0) ∈ Λ(R)w i t he γ
0 ∈ µ(Γ∗)\ΓL be an extended alternative such
that ((e x0,e γ
0),(x0,γ∗0)) ∈ Q(R). Let the set of such alternatives be denoted by
U ((x0,γ∗0),Q(R);Γ∗c
L ). Then, for every (e x,e γ),(e x0,e γ
0) ∈ Λ(R)w i t h( e γ,e γ
0) ∈
Γ∗
L × (µ(Γ∗)\ΓL), if (e x0,e γ
0) ∈ U ((x0,γ∗0),Q 0(R);Γ∗c
L )a n d( ( x0,γ∗0),(e x,e γ)) ∈
P (Q0
i(R)), then P(Q0
i(R)) ∩ {(e x0,e γ
0),(e x,e γ)}2 = P(Q0(R))∩{(e x0,e γ
0),(e x,e γ)}2.
Thus, by I,f o re v e r y( e x,e γ),(e x0,e γ
0) ∈ Λ(R)w i t h( e γ,e γ
0) ∈ Γ∗
L × (µ(Γ∗)\ΓL),
if (e x0,e γ












∈ P (Q0(R)). Moreover, by I,f o re v e r yQ ∈ ∆Ψ and ev-
ery (e x,e γ),(e x0,e γ













∈ P (Q(R)), whenever (e x0,e γ
0) ∈ U((x0,γ∗0),
Q00(R);Γ∗c
L )f o rs o m eQ00 ∈ ∆Ψ.
Let us construct a game form e γ
0 ∈ µ(Γ∗)\ΓL as (e x0,e γ
0) ∈ U((x0,γ∗0),Q 00(R);
Γ∗c
L )f o rs o m eQ00 ∈ ∆Ψ. Consider the case of #N ≥ 3a n d# ( N\S) ≥ 2.






follows: let f M0
i = {{x0},A\{x0}}; f M0
k = {{e x,x0}|∃ e x ∈ A\{x0}}; f M0
h = {A}
for any other h 6= i,k;a n df o ra n ym ∈ f M0, e g0 (m)=b x where {b x} ≡∩ h∈Nmh.
Then, since (x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), (x0,e γ
0) ∈ Λ(R) holds. Consider the case of
#N =2o r#( N\S) = 1. Then, choose i ∈ N\S,a n dt a k et h ei-dictatorial
game form γi as e γ
0 ∈ µ(Γ∗)\ΓL. In this case, since x0 is a maximal ele-
ment for i at Ri,( x0,γi) ∈ Λ(R) holds. Note that, since e γ
0 ∈ µ(Γ∗)\ΓL and
γ∗0 ∈ Γ∗\ΓL, it is possible to have (x0,e γ
0) ∈ U ((x0,γ∗0),Q 00(R);Γ∗c
L )f o rs o m e
Q00 ∈ ∆Ψ.T h u s ,w ec a nh a v eQ∗ ∈ ∆Ψ such that CΨ(Ψ(Q∗);R) * Γ∗
L.
O u rn e x tt a s ki st os h o wt h en e c e s s i t yo f∆Ψ ⊆ (F,Q−i)a n d{i} ∈
∩Q∈∆ΨL(Q). Let us deﬁne QA×Γ∗
L ≡
©
Q ∩ (A × Γ∗
L)
2 | Q ∈ Q
ª
and G (Q) ≡
©
Q ∩ (A × Γ∗
L)
2 | Q ∈ F
ª
. Then, G(Q)=QA×Γ∗
L.T h i si m p l i e s( F,Q−i)i se s -
sentially a universal domain within the restricted set of extended alternatives
A × Γ∗
L.T h u s ,i f ∆Ψ ⊇ Fn, then there exists a local dictator d ∈ N for the
choice problem over the restricted set of extended alternatives A×Γ∗
L.I nt h i s
case, if {j} / ∈∩ Q∈∆ΨL(Q) for any j ∈ N,t h e nf o rs o m eQ ∈ ∆Ψ, Qd does not
satisfy the condition (n-c) over the restricted set A × Γ∗
L.T h i si m p l i e st h a t ,
for some Q ∈ ∆Ψ, the associated social ordering function Q = Ψ(Q) cannot
satisfy the condition (n-c).
51P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5 :By Theorem 4, our remaining task is to examine the
uniform rationalizability by means of Q = Ψ(Q). A similar method used in
the proof of Theorem 3 can be applied to establish this result.
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